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Introduction 
It is difficult to think of a more timely or important topic than 
horizontal hydraulic fracturing and its impact on the environment. It 
is especially useful to have an exchange of views on this subject now, 
before the statutes, regulations, and court decisions start to roll in. 
Law professors—I cannot speak for anyone else—have a strong 
proclivity for backward-looking analysis, dissecting what should have 
been done after the basic direction of the law is set and the courts have 
spoken. It is much more useful to weigh the pros and cons of different 
approaches at an early stage in the evolution of an issue, although 
admittedly, it is also more risky. So I congratulate the Law Review on 
organizing today’s conference. 
Before I begin, it is appropriate to say a few words by way of 
background about horizontal hyrdrofracturing, or “fracking” for short. 
This will be familiar to many of you, but there may be others in the 
audience who are relatively unversed in the subject, and some context 
may help in following the debates on the various panels to come. 
What exactly is fracking and why is it different from ordinary oil 
and gas field production? I am not a petroleum engineer. But let me 
offer my understanding, expressed in lay terms, for what it is worth.  
Traditional production of oil and gas involves drilling a vertical 
pipe from the surface to an oil or gas reservoir in the ground.1 Because 
of the weight of the rock and soil above it, the oil or gas is under great 
pressure. Once the pipe penetrates the reservoir, that pressure causes 
the oil and gas to rise through the pipe to the surface, where it can be 
gathered for commercial use. Reservoir is a bit of a misnomer here. 
 
†  Charles Evans Hughes Professor, Columbia Law School. Many thanks to 
Dan Boyle for outstanding research assistance. This paper was presented as 
the keynote address at the Case Western Reserve Law Review Symposium, 
The Law and Policy of Hydraulic Fracturing, November 16, 2012. 
1. See Energy in Brief: What Is Shale Gas and Why Is It Important?, 
U.S. Energy Info. Admin., http://www.eia.gov/energy_in_brief/article/ 
about_shale_gas.cfm (last updated Dec. 5, 2012). 
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Sometimes there is literally a pool of oil or gas trapped in a hollow 
space between sedimentary layers of rock in the ground. But often 
conventional oil and gas deposits are embedded in permeable rock. In 
order to extract it, however, the rock must be sufficiently permeable 
that oil and gas will flow through it, into the pipe and up to the 
surface, once the deposit is penetrated by the pipe. 
Petroleum engineers have long known that there is a great deal 
of oil and gas in the ground that is trapped in rock that is not 
permeable, and hence cannot be extracted by simple drilling of a 
vertical pipe.2 In the parlance of the industry, the fissures that 
contain the valuable material are too “tight” to flow. These engineers 
have long sought a way to open up these fissures to let the trapped oil 
and gas flow out. 
One technology for doing this, known as hydraulic fracturing, has 
been around for about sixty years and is now routinely used to 
enhance the production from conventional oil and gas wells.3 
Hydraulic fracturing involves pumping a fluid, sometimes called “slick 
water,” down into the well under great pressure. The fluid is mostly 
water mixed with some proppant like sand or small ceramic balls plus 
a small amount of lubricating chemicals.4 The pressure from the water 
fractures the rock, and the sand props the fractures open. The 
fracturing fluid, or most of it at any rate, is then pumped out, and if 
all goes well the oil or gas flows out behind it.  
The recent innovation, which is responsible for all the stir, 
consists of combining hydraulic fracturing with a relatively new 
technology, horizontal drilling. This consists, as the name suggests, of 
drilling down vertically and then, at some point, turning the drill bit 
and moving horizontally through a seam of rock.5 Much of the oil and 
gas in the ground that is trapped in nonpermeable rock is found in 
relatively thin seams of coal or shale. A couple dozen years ago, a 
number of independent gas producers started fiddling around with the 
idea that you could combine horizontal drilling with hydraulic 
fracturing, and this might be a way to extract gas from these thin 
seams of coal or shale. They would drill down to the seam, turn the 
pipe horizontally and thread it through the seam, and then inject the 
 
2. See Vikram Rao, Shale Gas: The Promise and the Peril 7 (2012). 
3. Hannah Wiseman, Untested Waters: The Rise of Hydraulic Fracturing 
in Oil and Gas Production and the Need to Revisit Regulation, 20 
Fordham Envtl. L. Rev. 115, 122–23 (2009). 
4. Heather Cooley & Christina Donnelly, Pac. Inst., Hydraulic 
Fracturing and Water Resources: Separating the Frack from 
the Fiction 21 (2012) (detailing the variations in the composition of 
fracking fluids to compensate for the specifics of local geology and 
individual wells). 
5. See Leonardo Maugeri, Oil: The Next Revolution 42–44 (2012). 
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seam with fracturing fluid. After a long period of trial and error, an 
independent gas producer named George Mitchell, working in the 
Barnett Shale field near Fort Worth, Texas, figured out the right 
combination of horizontal drilling, pressure, and proppants to get the 
gas flowing out of shale.6 Mitchell’s breakthrough came in 1998. His 
success was observed by other producers, and they quickly emulated 
his methods.  
What was the impact of Mr. Mitchell’s successful innovation? It 
now appears that it means nothing less than an enormous expansion 
of the reserves of oil and gas in the United States. No one knows for 
sure by how much.7 To some extent it depends on prices going 
forward. It could mean a doubling of reserves; it could mean more.  
The impact of this sudden surge in reserves is somewhat different 
for gas and oil.8 Gas is transported primarily by pipeline, which means 
the relevant market is regional or national. Gas, if you will, is a closed 
market. An expansion of U.S. reserves of gas means a reduction in the 
price of gas nationally.  
Oil is bought and sold on a world market, so the impact is 
different. A surge in oil reserves in the United States will yield some 
stabilization of the price of oil in the United States, but not very much. 
An expansion of reserves basically means more wealth for the United 
States and less for the countries from which we currently import oil.  
For both commodities, the sudden expansion of reserves means 
more jobs in the oil and gas extraction industries. Exactly how many 
more jobs is guesswork. President Obama, in his 2012 State of the 
Union address, said 600,000 additional jobs.9 That is a big deal in a 
soft employment economy. The unemployment rate in North Dakota, 
where oil production using fracking technology is booming, is 3.7 
percent, less than half the national average.10 Workers on oil rigs in 
North Dakota can make $70,000 in five months.11 Supervisors earn  
6. Daniel Yergin, The Quest 325–32 (2011).  
7. The exact amount of unconventional oil reserves remain uncertain, but 
recent estimates suggest the United States and Canada have a combined 
1,301.7 billion barrels in total technically recoverable unconventional oil, 
that is, oil that may or may not be economically recoverable at present. 
In comparison, the proved reserves (oil that can be economically 
recovered at current prices) for the entire world is assessed at 1,354.2 
billion barrels. Amy Meyers Jaffe et al., The Status of World 
Oil Reserves: Conventional and Unconventional Resources in 
the Future Supply Mix 17–19 (Oct. 2011). 
8. Ernest J. Moniz, Henry J. Jacoby & Anthony J.M. Megs, MIT 
Study on the Future of Natural Gas 7 (2011). 
9. President Barack H. Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 25, 2012). 
10. Eric Konigsberg, Kuwait on the Prairie, New Yorker, Apr. 25, 2011, 
at 43. 
11. Id. at 50. 
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$320,000 a year. Landowners in North Dakota who are lucky enough 
to own two square miles of land in the Bakken shale area get $1 
million up front and $500,000 a year in royalties, estimated to last 
two decades.12  
For gas there are other dramatic effects, because the closed 
market means a fall in natural gas prices.13 This has lots of benefits. 
Home heating bills go down. Electric bills are either stable or go 
down. Chemical and fertilizer plants that consume lots of natural gas 
or gas byproducts begin to move back to the United States. Some 
heavy industry may move back or stay because of lower energy costs.  
Other impacts of falling gas prices are of more ambiguous import. 
I suspect that the fracking revolution probably means the end of the 
nuclear power industry in the United States.14 Nuclear power cannot 
compete against cheap gas as a source of combustion for power 
generation. The fracking revolution also has the coal industry on the 
ropes. The coal producers like to blame the Obama Administration 
for launching a “war on coal,” but a bigger problem is that under 
longstanding environmental regulations coal is less attractive as a 
source of power generation than cheap gas. Perhaps more 
problematically, lots of cheap gas also means the solar power industry 
and the wind power industry will need continuing government 
subsidies if they are to stay afloat.15 If budgetary stringencies mean 
those subsidies are curtailed, they too could be done in by cheap gas.  
On the oil front, the surge in domestic reserves will have less 
impact, because the price of oil is fixed by supply and demand in the 
world market, and the price will likely remain relatively high due to 
rising demand in Asia and the developing world. But there will still be 
big effects. U.S. imports of oil are way down, from 60 percent of total 
oil consumption to about 40 percent. The recession and improvements 
in fuel efficiency are partly responsible.16 But the surge in domestic 
 
12. Id. at 51.  
13. Natural Gas: An Unconventional Bonanza, Economist (Special 
Report), July 14, 2012, at 1, 5–7. 
14. See Brad Plumer, Another Casualty of the Shale Gas Boom: Nuclear 
Power, Wash. Post (Feb. 21, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/02/21/another-casualty-of-the-shale-gas-boom-
nuclear-power; David Biello, Is Nuclear Power Doomed to Dwindle?, Sci. 
Am. (Feb. 5, 2013), http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/2013/ 
02/05/is-nuclear-power-doomed-to-dwindle. 
15. See Henry D. Jacoby et al., The Influence of Shale Gas on U.S. Energy and 
Environmental Policy, 1 Econ. Energy & Envtl. Pol’y 37, 49 (2012). 
16. In addition to surging domestic production, U.S. energy consumption is 
holding flat or declining annually, magnifying the impact of decreased 
imports. Short Term Energy Outlook, U.S. Energy Info. Admin.,  
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/steo/report/us_oil.cfm (last visited May 
15, 2013). 
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production, especially from North Dakota, is perhaps the biggest 
factor. North Dakota, almost overnight, now produces more oil than 
Alaska and is second only to Texas among U.S. states, all due to 
fracking technology.17 The impact on the balance of payments is 
enormous—roughly $100 billion a year is now going to those lucky 
workers and landowners in North Dakota rather than to Saudi 
princes. The International Energy Agency in Paris estimates the U.S. 
will be the largest producer of oil in the world by 2020, surpassing 
Saudi Arabia.18 Energy independence, which every President since 
Nixon has claimed to be a top national priority, suddenly is beginning 
to look like less of a pipe dream.  
So that is a capsule summary of fracking and why it is a very big 
deal; a “game changer” to use the current cliché. To say that this has 
come as a surprise to energy experts, politicians, and economists 
would be an understatement. No one saw this coming. 
As a startling and unforeseen development, the fracking revolution 
presents a number of interesting questions. I will address four. These 
are not the only significant questions presented by this surprise. But 
they are ones that resonate particularly with me, a property and envi-
ronmental law teacher. Here, in brief summary, are the four questions. 
First, why did fracking technology, perhaps the most important 
innovation in energy technology in a generation, emerge in the United 
States rather than somewhere else? Answering this question may 
provide some clues about the conditions that promote innovation in 
developing new sources of energy more generally.  
Second, are there any novel environmental risks presented by 
fracking? Fracking undoubtedly poses environmental risks, but we 
need to ascertain whether they are the kinds of risks that can be 
addressed by ratcheting up existing regulatory regimes, or if 
something entirely new is needed.  
Third, if there are novel risks, what is the best regulatory strategy 
for addressing those risks? 
Fourth and finally, what should a concerned citizen anxious about 
the prospect of global warming think about fracking? Is fracking 
something to be opposed in order to promote a transition to alternative 
energy, or is it something to be embraced as a bridge to a greener 
future? 
 
17. Current North Dakota production is over 720,000 barrels per day, 
behind only Texas, at approximately two million barrels per day. U.S. 
Monthly Crude Oil Production Reaches Highest Level Since 1998, U.S. 
Energy Info. Admin. (Dec. 4, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/todayin 
energy/detail.cfm?id=9030; see also Russell Gold, Oil and Gas Bubble 
Up All Over, Wall St. J., Jan 3, 2012, at A7.  
18. Int’l Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2012, at 23 (2012). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 4·2013 
Four Questions About Fracking 
976 
I. Why Did the Fracking Revolution Happen Here? 
On to the first question: why did the fracking revolution happen 
in the United States rather than somewhere else? 
Let us start with the role of the federal government. One possible 
explanation can be easily eliminated. Current fracking technology was 
not developed by the federal government. Over the years, the U.S. 
Department of Energy has channeled billions of dollars in grants to 
promote new sources of energy, ranging from nuclear fusion, to 
synthetic fuels, to photovoltaic cells, to battery technology, to 
hydrogen cars. Yet comparatively little in the way of research dollars 
has been devoted to the development of new oil and gas extraction 
techniques.19 The United States devotes more public money to energy 
research than any other country, but fracking did not emerge out of 
an Energy Department laboratory. 
This does not mean the federal role was irrelevant. Although little 
grant money went to developing fracking technology, the federal 
government provided a valuable subsidy, in the form of a tax break.20 
Tucked away in a 1980 tax bill designed primarily to impose a windfall 
profits tax on oil and gas producers was a provision, known as section 
29,21 that provided a special federal tax credit for drilling for so-called 
unconventional natural gas. This special credit no doubt helped keep 
several competing gas producers going in the 1990s in their quest for 
technology to extract gas from the Barnett Shale in Texas. So the 
federal government did not invent fracking, but perhaps it kept the 
technology from dying before its time. Note, however, that the 
government support did not take the form of the government picking 
winners and losers. Rather, the primary form of support was a general 
 
19. From 1978 to 2010, approximately $3 billion in Department of Energy 
Research and Development expenditures were focused on oil and gas. In 
this same period, the Department of Energy devoted approximately $26 
billion to coal, $45 billion to nuclear, and, more recently, $20 billion to 
renewable energy generation. See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Direct 
Federal Financial Interventions and Subsidies in Energy in 
Fiscal Year 2010, at 34 (2011). 
20. Federal spending related to fracking research equaled roughly $137 
million over three decades, primarily in the 1970s—well before the major 
successes of recent years. But tax breaks supporting fracking pioneers 
were substantial, totaling over $10 billion from 1980 to the present. 
Kevin Begos, Early On, Fracking Got Injection of Federal Funding, Tax 
Breaks, Wash. Times, Sep. 23, 2012, http://www.washingtontimes. 
com/news/2012/sep/23/early-on-fracking-got-injection-of-federal-funding. 
21. Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-223, § 231(a), 
94 Stat. 229, 268 (formerly codified at I.R.C. § 29; now codified as 
amended at I.R.C. § 45k (2006)). See generally Mark A. Muntean, 
Rebirth of a Tax Credit: An Overview of Code Section 29, 27 S. Tex. 
L. Rev. 235 (1986). 
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tax credit, broadly available to anyone who could claim to be drilling 
for unconventional gas. In effect, the decision to take the subsidy was 
made unilaterally by individual producers, each of whom could 
choose, based on its own calculus, whether to take up the subsidy or 
leave it on the table.  
What about industry structure? Another possibility that can be 
eliminated is that the innovation came from the research department 
of one of the major oil companies that continually advertise their 
commitment to energy innovation on TV. It is true that many of the 
majors are American, and that these companies invest huge sums of 
money searching for new sources of energy and new ways of 
extracting it. But the critical breakthrough in the development of 
fracking technology was not developed by a major. It was achieved in 
the late 1990s through a trial-and-error process doggedly pursued by 
George Mitchell’s energy company, an independent gas producer.22 
Mitchell’s company was not exactly a pipsqueak in the energy world; 
it sold for $3.5 billion to another independent firm once the potential 
value of fracking in the Barnett Shale area became apparent.23 But 
Mitchell had nothing comparable to the resources or the engineering 
talent of the major oil companies.  
I would emphasize several other factors about oil and gas produc-
tion in the United States which I think were indirectly responsible for 
the fracking revolution. One is that mineral rights in the United 
States are predominantly privately owned. The United States follows 
the so-called ad coelum rule, by which the owner of land is deemed to 
own the air rights above the land and the subsurface rights below the 
land.24 Ownership of the subsurface rights includes the right to extract 
“fugacious” minerals found by drilling down into the subsurface 
column below the land, including oil, gas, and groundwater. This is 
why, in the Beverly Hillbillies, the discovery of oil under the Clampett 
farm leads to the family moving to Beverly Hills. The United States is 
something of an outlier in this regard. Most other countries follow the 
rule that subsurface minerals belong to the state, and so permission from 
the government is required to engage in subsurface mineral development. 
Why might private ownership of subsurface mineral rights 
translate into greater innovation in drilling technology? You might be 
thinking—“greed.” But I am not sure the governments that control 
 
22. See Yergin, supra note 6, at 325–28. 
23. Jesse Bogan, The Father of Shale Gas, Forbes (Jul. 16, 2009), 
http://www.forbes.com/2009/07/16/george-mitchell-gas-business-energy-
shale.html. 
24. 63c Am. Jur. 2d Property § 12 (2009); see also Thomas W. Merrill, 
Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining Property Rights, 14 
J. Legal Stud. 13, 16, 26–36 (1985); Peter M. Gerhart & Robert D. 
Cheren, Recognizing the Shared Ownership of Subsurface Resource 
Pools, 63 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1041, 1045–46, 1048–50  (2013). 
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mineral rights development in other parts of the world are necessarily 
more public spirited than the landowners who agree to enter into leases 
of their mineral rights to oil and gas production companies. I would 
emphasize something else—decentralization of control. In a country 
like the United States that follows the ad coelum rule, ownership and 
hence control over subsurface minerals is fragmented among tens of 
thousands of separate owners. A production company that wants to 
experiment with an innovative technology can always find an owner 
sufficiently willing to take risks—or if you are more cynical, 
sufficiently ignorant of the risks—to convey the required rights. When 
mineral rights are owned by the government, access is necessarily 
controlled by a centralized bureaucracy. Bureaucracies tend to be 
slow and cautious. Promoting innovative extraction technologies that 
could easily end up a bust is difficult to explain to the boss.  
A very rough and admittedly inconclusive empirical confirmation 
of this point is provided by looking at a map of the United States 
where fracking activity is underway, and comparing it to a map 
showing areas of land and associated mineral rights that are controlled 
by the federal government. There is very little overlap. It could be, of 
course, that it just happens that there are few promising shale 
deposits under federal lands. But this is almost certainly not the 
explanation. Oil and gas producers have simply concluded that dealing 
with private owners is far easier than dealing with the bureaucracy in 
the Department of the Interior25—or waiting for the lawsuits to be 
resolved if and when the Department agrees to start leasing.26  
Another factor that helps explain the fracking revolution is that 
regulation of oil and gas production in the United States is largely a 
matter of state rather than federal law. The explanation for this is 
historical. Oil and gas production developed well before the 1970s, 
when federal environmental law came on the scene.27 Oil and gas 
 
25. Rules for fracking on federal land have been repeatedly delayed, largely 
due to political pressures. While the Department of the Interior floated 
proposed rules for fracking on federal lands in May 2012, extensive 
public comments ensured there would be no final rules published before 
the 2012 presidential election. Ben Geman, Interior Delays ‘Fracking’ 
Rules, The Hill (Dec. 11, 2012, 5:16 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-
wire/e2-wire/272307-interior-pushes-back-fracking-rule-timeline. 
26. A harbinger of the future here may be Center for Biological Diversity v. 
Bureau of Land Management, No. C 11-06174 PSG, 2013 WL 1405938 
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2013), in which a magistrate judge has held that the 
Interior Department cannot enter into leases that contemplate the use of 
fracking on federal lands until a full-blown Environmental Impact 
Statement is prepared that takes a “hard look” at the environmental 
risks associated with this technology. Id. at *6. 
27. This dramatic expansion of the federal role in environmental protection 
largely began with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 
declaring “a national policy which will encourage productive and enjoya-
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regulation was traditionally a state matter, and was primarily ori-
ented toward maximizing production, not controlling environmental 
harms.28 Probably because regulatory structures were already in place 
at the state level when the environmental revolution got underway, 
federal environmental regulation has largely left this system of state 
regulation untouched.29  
Why does state regulation help foster technological innovation? 
You may be thinking state regulation equals lax regulation. But not all 
federal regulation is strict, and not all state regulation lax. Again, the 
more apt significance of state regulation is that regulatory oversight of 
the oil and gas industry is decentralized. Different states have different 
approaches, meaning regulators in some states are more tolerant of 
experimental or innovative production technologies than regulators in 
others.30 Again, this differs from other nations, where regulation of the 
oil and gas industry tends to be much more centralized.  
Why does decentralized regulation promote innovation? The 
theory that explains this might go as follows. All regulators tend to be 
risk averse.31 If things go well, they get no credit. If things go badly, 
they get blamed. But the degree of risk aversion of regulators falls 
along a spectrum. Some are more risk averse than others. Where 
regulation is decentralized, a new technology like fracking can find at 
least one or two states where it is allowed to get going. This sets in 
motion a natural experiment. If the results are good, and the risks do 
not seem too great, then risk-averse regulators in other states will give 
 
ble harmony between man and his environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2006). 
See generally Michael J. Graetz, The End of Energy 41–59 (2011). 
28. Bruce M. Kramer, Federal Legislative and Administrative Regulation of 
Hydraulic Fracturing Operations, 44 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 837, 838 
(2012) (“[T]he decades of the 1930s and 1940s became ones where states 
responded to the lack of federal regulation with the enactment of state 
oil and gas conservation statutes that delegated to state agencies 
broadened powers to regulate the oil and gas industry.”). 
29. What federal regulation there is of the oil and gas industry tends to focus 
on specific incidents, such as oil spills, see 33 U.S.C. § 2712 (2006 & Supp. 
V. 2011), or on the types of activity that oil and gas companies happen to 
engage in, such as the transportation of chemicals. We do not see the form 
of cradle-to-grave regulations present for industries as in the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act. 42 U.S.C. § 6901–6992k (2006) (regulating 
the transportation, treatment, and disposal of hazardous wastes).  
30. See Christopher S. Kulander, 63 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1101 (2013) 
(describing current regulatory regimes in major fracking states). 
31. See William W. Buzbee, Remembering Repose: Voluntary Contamination 
Cleanup Approvals, Incentives, and the Costs of Interminable Liability, 80 
Minn. L. Rev. 35, 91–93 (1995) (discussing risk avoidance in 
bureaucracy, using the example of the EPA). 
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it the green light to go ahead there, too.32 If the results are not so 
good, or the risks seem too large, then the regulators in other states 
will throw up roadblocks to the new technology, and the experiment 
will wither away. In a more centralized regulatory environment, which 
tends to be the norm in other parts of the world, the experiment is 
less likely to get off the ground in the first place. This is because the 
median regulator is risk averse. And being the only regulatory game 
in town, the risk aversion of the median regulator is likely to translate 
into hostility to technological innovation. 
The last structural feature of the United States I will mention is 
the highly developed infrastructure of pipelines, and the practice of 
treating pipelines like common carriers open to all.33 This allows small 
producers without their own pipelines or without significant economic 
or political clout to gain access to markets. Again, the situation in 
other parts of the world is very different, where pipelines are either 
owned by the government or are not regarded as common carriers 
accessible to all.34 One could say the United States has an open 
infrastructure in energy markets, at least on this dimension, and that 
this allows experimentation by small firms to flourish. 
So if I had to sum up the factors that explain why the United 
States developed fracking technology before anyone else, I would say 
in one word: decentralization. Specifically, decentralization of control 
over resource development. One case study does not prove the general 
 
32. Critics of state regulation often raise the specter of industry capture at 
local or state levels, yet nothing at this point suggests those risks are 
greater than they would be at the federal level. David B. Spence, 
Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the Political Economy of Energy 
Production, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 431, 507 (2013) (“There is no evidence 
to suggest that the states’ varying approaches to [fracking] questions 
reflect industry capture; an equally likely explanation is that each state 
is balancing the costs and benefits of development differently.”). 
33. Interstate oil pipelines have been classified as common carriers since 
1906. Hepburn Act, Pub. L. No. 59-337, 34 Stat. 584 (1906) (amending 
the Interstate Commerce Act’s common carrier provisions to apply to 
“the transportation of oil or other commodity, except water and except 
natural or artificial gas, by means of pipe lines”); see also Christopher J. 
Barr, Unfinished Business, FERC’s Evolving Standard for Capacity 
Rights on Oil Pipelines, 32 Energy L.J. 563, 567–68 (discussing the 
history and statutory basis for oil pipelines’ common carrier status 
under the Interstate Commerce Act). Interstate gas pipelines were 
excepted from the common carrier requirements of the Interstate 
Commerce Act, but beginning in the 1980s, a series of Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission regulations provided gas producers with open 
access to pipelines. See 18 C.F.R. pt. 284 (2012). 
34. See, e.g., Dylan Cors, Breaking the Bottleneck: The Future of Russia’s 
Oil Pipelines, 7 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 597, 606 (1997) (comparing 
pipeline regulation in the United States with Russian and European 
legal regimes). 
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point. But the fracking revolution is at least a cautionary tale for 
those who assume that overarching federal energy policy is the key to 
innovation in energy. It may be that private property rights, 
entrepreneurialism, local control, and the absence of federal 
bureaucracy make a better recipe for the development of “game 
changing” technological breakthroughs. 
II. Does Fracking Present Any Novel Risks? 
The second question I will address is whether fracking presents 
any novel environmental problems that warrant a change in our 
existing systems of environmental regulation. Why the emphasis on 
novel risks? The following thought experiment may be useful. Imagine 
a discovery in the United States of new conventional sources of oil 
and gas equivalent in magnitude to the additional reserves of oil and 
gas brought on line by fracking. In other words, imagine we discover a 
huge new deposit of oil and gas in some backwater area of the country 
that somehow had been overlooked all these years. How, if at all, do 
the risks posed by fracking differ from the kinds of risks that would be 
associated with an upsurge in oil and gas production using conventional 
techniques? This question is important because it tells us whether we 
need new laws and regulations to deal with fracking. To the extent 
fracking-generated production is no different than a surge in 
conventional production, the solution is presumably to ratchet up the 
existing regulatory framework for oil and gas production to meet the 
challenges of the new surge in production. If, however, fracking is 
associated with new risks that have no parallel under conventional 
production, then we have to start thinking about developing a new 
regulatory framework to deal with these new risks.  
The environmental bill of indictment against fracking is a long 
one. Among the members of some environmental advocacy groups, I 
suspect that the most telling charge is that fracking, by giving us 
cheap gas, will delay the process of converting to renewables, and 
hence will compromise efforts to reduce the risk of climate change.35 
This issue is sufficiently important that I will postpone it to question 
four. For many landowners who own property in the vicinity of 
prospective fracking operations, the most critical concern is that 
fracking will contaminate groundwater aquifers, thereby jeopardizing 
water supplies and property values.36 Fracking fluid contains a small 
percentage of chemicals, some of which, like arsenic, are known toxics 
and others of which, like benzene, are known carcinogens. If these 
chemicals find their way into the groundwater, they could pose a 
health risk or at the very least would seriously impair property values. 
 
35. See Jacoby et al., supra note 15. 
36. See Wiseman, supra note 3, at 131–32. 
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Other charges are that fracking operations will damage local roads 
due to heavy truck traffic, cause air pollution due to releases from 
poorly controlled wells or containment ponds, place unsustainable 
demands on local water supplies, damage wildlife habitat by requiring 
the construction of new pipelines, and even cause earthquakes.37 The 
question is which if any of these risks requires the development of new 
regulatory systems. 
Virtually all of these risks are matters of real concern. But many 
are the kinds of externalities that would be generated by an upsurge 
in conventional oil and gas production. Here I would include truck 
traffic, air pollution, and habitat destruction from pipelines. There is 
no reason to believe these problems cannot be addressed by adapting 
existing forms of regulation to meet the new challenges. Surges in 
truck traffic can be met by new limits on the weight or type of 
vehicles or by user fees on those that use heavy trucks on back 
country roads. Air pollution can be addressed by new types of 
stationary source controls on gas and oil wells—something that the 
EPA is already moving toward doing.38 Habitat destruction can be 
controlled by applying local land use controls and the Endangered 
Species Act.39  
Among the risks that are unique to fracking include its voracious 
consumption of water. But the demand for water used in fracking 
appears to be manageable in areas like Pennsylvania and Ohio where 
surface water, which is renewable, is used.40 In areas like West Texas 
where groundwater must be tapped, existing permitting schemes can 
be used to allocate scarce local water supplies. Ideally, increased 
recycling of fracking fluid will reduce the demand on water supplies 
nearly everywhere.41 Earthquake risks fall in the category of “more 
 
37. See Hannah Wiseman, Regulatory Adaptation in Fractured Appalachia, 
21 Vill. Envtl. L.J. 229, 254–56 (2010) (detailing surface impacts of 
fracking operations). 
38. In 2012, the EPA issued regulations aimed at curbing emissions from oil 
and gas production sites, specifically targeting fracking operations. See 
Oil and Natural Gas Sector: New Source Performance Standards and 
National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants Reviews, 77 
Fed. Reg. 49,490 (Aug. 16, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 63). 
39. See Kalyani Robbins, Awakening the Slumbering Giant: How Horizontal 
Drilling Technology Brought the Endangered Species Act to Bear on 
Hydraulic Fracturing, 63 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1143 (2013). 
40. Local authorities in these areas have shown willingness to manage water 
usage by fracking operations by changing consumption rates or 
suspending usage. See Cooley & Donnelly, supra note 4, at 16 
(describing state responses to water withdrawal for fracking operations). 
41. States regulating fracking operations increasingly require or encourage 
wastewater recycling and reclamation. These requirements may become 
increasingly widespread, as they decrease pressure on local water sources 
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study required.”42 The most prominently discussed episode, from 
Ohio, involved injection of spent fracking fluid into deep geologic 
formations, not fracking operations themselves.43 If deep injection of 
spent fluid causes earthquakes, then plans to require carbon 
sequestration by deep injection of CO2 also need to be reexamined. So 
this may not be a problem, or may be a problem not unique to fracking. 
The water contamination risks are the matter of greatest concern 
to local landowners and loom large in the public imagination. They 
are also a category of risk that presents a plausible claim to being 
novel or unprecedented. The matter is complicated by the variety of 
potential pathways of water contamination.44 The pathway that has 
received the most attention is the prospect that fracking fluid injected 
into deep shale formations might migrate upward through fractures 
into groundwater aquifers. There is currently no documented instance 
of this happening,45 and most experts think it highly unlikely.46 The 
 
and decrease the need to dispose of waste water. See Wiseman, supra 
note 37, at 267–68 & n.245.  
42. As of yet, the connections between fracking operations and earthquakes 
are unclear. While it has long been known that oil and gas extraction 
generally may cause increased seismic activity, the only United States 
Geological Survey study on the question did not find that fracking 
presents a greater than normal risk for these events. See News Release, 
David J. Hayes, Deputy Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Interior, Is the Recent 
Increase in Felt Earthquakes in the Central US Natural or Manmade? 
(Apr. 11, 2012) (“USGS’s studies do not suggest that hydraulic 
fracturing, commonly known as ‘fracking,’ causes the increased rate of 
earthquakes. USGS’s scientists have found, however, that at some 
locations the increase in seismicity coincides with the injection of 
wastewater in deep disposal wells.”); see also Nat’l Research Council, 
Induced Seismicity Potential in Energy Technologies 156 (2012) 
(reaching similar conclusions). 
43. See Mark Niquette, Ohio Tries to Escape Fate as Dumping Ground for 
Fracking Fluid, Bloomberg (Feb. 1, 2012, 12:01 AM), http://www. 
bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-01/ohio-tries-to-escape-fate-as-a-dumping-
ground-for-fracking-fluid.html. 
44. Moniz, Jacoby & Megs, supra note 8, at 7 (“Shale development requires 
large-scale fracturing of the shale formation to induce economic 
production rates. There has been concern that these fractures can also 
penetrate shallow freshwater zones and contaminate them with 
fracturing fluid, but there is no evidence that this is occurring.”). 
45. The most recent United States Geological Survey assessment of 127 
sample wells in the Fayetteville Shale area of Arkansas found no 
evidence that fracking operations had contaminated local groundwater, 
despite over 4,000 drilling operations in the vicinity. Timothy M. 
Kresse et al., U.S. Geological Survey, Shallow Groundwater 
Quality and Geochemistry in the Fayetteville Shale Gas-
Production Area, North-Central Arkansas (2011); see also 
Ayesha Rascoe, No Contamination from Fracking Found in 2 Arkansas 
Counties-USGS, Reuters (Jan. 9, 2013, 7:17 PM), http://www. 
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basic reason is that shale seams are typically very deep, up to a mile 
underground, and the enormous weight of rock and soil above these 
seams will compress any fractures that might otherwise allow fracking 
fluid to migrate upward.47 Still, fracking involves the uncontrolled 
release of toxic chemicals—underground and out of sight. This makes 
people understandably nervous, and with good reason. We have had 
other experience recently with assurances from experts that 
complicated and novel activities—like buying and selling collateralized 
debt obligations—pose no risk, and we have lived to regret it. 
Another pathway of contamination might be from deep geologic 
formations where spent fluid is injected. Again, the depth of the 
injection, the lack of porosity in overlying rock, and the natural force 
of gravity make contamination of aquifers much closer to the surface 
unlikely. But the uncontrolled nature of the injection of waste 
chemicals causes apprehension. 
Other potential pathways of contamination have elicited less 
public attention but may present greater risks. Improper sealing of 
vertical drilling pipes could allow fracking fluid to escape at depths 
 
reuters.com/article/2013/01/10/usa-fracking-arkansas-study-idUSL1E9C 
9FCZ20130110. A 2011 Duke University study of wells in the Marcellus 
Shale area of Pennsylvania found elevated methane levels, but no signs 
of fracking fluids or chemicals in the groundwater. Steven G. Osborne et 
al., Methane Contamination of Drinking Water Accompanying Gas-Well 
Drilling and Hydraulic Fracturing, 108 Proc. Nat’l Acad. Sci. 8172 
(2011). The Duke study’s authors later theorized that methane may be 
moving through previously unknown, naturally occurring pathways, 
resulting in unforeseen migration. Nathaniel R. Warner et al., 
Geochemical Evidence for Possible Natural Migration of Marcellus 
Formation Brine to Shallow Aquifers in Pennsylvania, 109 Proc. Nat’l 
Acad. Sci. 11961 (2012). 
46. A 2011 Department of Energy study “share[d] the prevailing view that the 
risk of fracturing fluid leakage into groundwater sources through fractures 
made in deep shale reservoirs is remote.” Shale Gas Prod. Subcomm., 
U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Second Ninety Day Report 17 (2011). 
47. Only one study has suggested that shale seams may be more permeable 
than previously estimated, and thus susceptible to fracking fluid 
migration. But this study relied entirely on computer modeling and no 
field data, drawing strong criticism from other experts. This illustrates 
one of the major difficulties in determining the risks of groundwater 
contamination—understanding the geology of shale formations more 
than a mile deep is limited, and the subject is difficult to research. See 
Tom Meyers, Potential Contaminant Pathways From Hydraulically 
Fractured Shale to Aquifers, 50 Ground Water 872 (2012); see also 
Abrahm Lustgarten, New Study Predicts Frack Fluids Can Migrate to 
Aquifers Within Years, Pro Publica (May 1, 2012, 3:29 PM), 
http://www.propublica.org/article/new-study-predicts-frack-fluids-can-
migrate-to-aquifers-within-years (reviewing the Meyers study and 
criticizing its methodology). 
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much closer to aquifers.48 Improper lining of surface containments 
could lead to leaching of fluid into groundwater, as could unprotected 
blowouts. Accidental spills from trucks are always a possibility. It is 
also possible that fracking activity might disturb pockets of methane 
gas closer to surface aquifers, or could agitate sediment in the bottom 
of water wells, which would then contaminate the well water.49 
Collectively, the water contamination risks are relatively novel 
and have elicited a fair degree of anxiety. Regulations of the “best 
practices” variety designed to minimize the risk of leaking from 
improperly sealed vertical pipes, or from blowouts, or from surface 
containment ponds, are both feasible and desirable. But there is no 
known technology to reduce the risks from many of the potential 
pathways of contamination—including the scariest, if the most 
remote, risks presented by injection of fracking fluid into deep shale 
seams or into geologic formations for disposal. 
So I would conclude that the water contamination risks are novel 
and do not have any close parallel in conventional oil and gas 
production. The experts may be right that based on geology the risks 
of contamination from deep injection are close to zero. But only time 
will tell for sure. In the meantime, nearly everyone who draws water 
from an aquifer above or in the vicinity of fracking activity is a guinea 
pig. We need to put in place some regulatory system to address the 
risks of water contamination associated with the uncontrolled release 
or injection of fracking fluid. And since all pathways of contamination 
pose risks unique to fracking, we should adopt a regulatory structure 
broad enough to address those risks, too.  
III. How Should We Address Novel Fracking Risks? 
The third question is, given that fracking presents novel issues of 
water contamination, what sort of regulatory system should be put in 
place to address those risks? David Schizer, my colleague and dean at 
Columbia Law School, and I are writing a paper about this.50 Let me 
offer some of the highlights of our argument.  
48. See Osborn et al., supra note 45. 
49. This problem of sediment disturbance may explain why numerous 
reported cases of alleged fracking contamination turn out to be incorrect. 
The drilling process has been found to agitate preexisting sediment, 
making water appear dirty or unsafe, without any evidence of fracturing 
chemicals in the water. Elizabeth W. Boyer et al., Ctr. for 
Rural Pa., The Impact of Marcellus Gas Drilling on Rural 
Drinking Water Supplies (2011) (comparing water wells before and 
after fracking; finding no change in methane, but finding an increase in 
sediment and iron in water). 
50. Thomas W. Merrill & David M. Schizer, The Shale Oil and Gas Revolution, 
Hydraulic Fracturing, and Water Contamination: A Regulatory Strategy,  
98 Minn. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2013).  
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The first issue is whether to adopt a system of ex ante or ex post 
regulation.51 Ex ante regulation tries to head off harm before it occurs. 
Ex post regulation puts a price on harm after it occurs. In many 
contexts, ex ante is better, particularly if we have significant 
information about harms and how to prevent them.  
We do not, however, have good information at present about the 
expected magnitude and incidence of water contamination caused by 
fracking. With respect to the central source of anxiety—the risks of 
migration of contaminants from shale rock formations to nearby 
aquifers—we have a classic he-said, she-said situation. The industry 
says the risk is basically nonexistent.52 The environmentalists say the 
harm could be catastrophic.53 Until we have more actual experience 
with horizontal fracking, we will not know for sure who is right.  
Nor do we have good options for controlling the incidence of 
contamination, certainly not from all potential pathways of 
contamination. We know how producers can minimize the risks of 
contamination from surface activities, like leaky containment tanks or 
spills from trucks. But we are basically in the dark about how to 
minimize the risks from fracking activity itself. Again, over time some 
consensus views will probably emerge about best practices. But for 
the moment, producers are in a learning-by-doing mode. Without 
better information, it is impossible to design a sensible system of ex 
ante regulation.  
The environmentalists would say, when in doubt apply the 
precautionary principle.54 But the only type of ex ante regulation we 
 
51. The factors differentiating ex ante and ex post regulation often parallel 
the arguments regarding rules and standards in law. See generally Louis 
Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Approach, 42 Duke 
L.J. 557 (1992); see also Robert Innes, Enforcement Costs, Optimal 
Sanctions, and the Choice Between Ex-post Liability and Ex-ante 
Regulation, 24 Int’l Rev L. & Econ. 29 (2004). 
52. Recent statements by Rex Tillerson, CEO of Exxon Mobil, to Forbes 
magazine provide an example of this industry position: “[T]he 
precautionary principle will absolutely undermine the economy. . . . If 
you want to live by the precautionary principle, then crawl up in a ball 
and live in a cave.” Brian O’Keefe, Exxon’s Big Bet on Shale Gas, CNN 
Money (Apr. 16, 2012, 5:00 AM), http://tech.fortune.cnn.com/2012/ 
04/16/exxon-shale-gas-fracking. 
53. See, e.g., Statement of Allison Chin, President of the Sierra Club (July 
28, 2012), available at http://content.sierraclub.org/naturalgas (“No 
state has adequate protections in place. Even where there are rules, they 
are poorly monitored and enforced. Thanks to the multiple federal 
exemptions, we can’t even count on the federal government to keep us 
safe.”); Amy Mall, Safe Fracking Is a Fairy-Tale—The Latest Science 
from Europe, EcoWatch (Oct. 11, 2012), http://ecowatch.org/2012/ 
safe-fracking-a-fairy-tale. 
54. See Cass R. Sunstein, Worst Case Scenarios 119 (2009) (“When 
risks have catastrophic worst-case scenarios, it makes sense to take 
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could possibly adopt given the dearth of information about expected 
harms and control measures would be to impose a moratorium on 
fracking until further information is gathered about its potential 
adverse effects. You could call this the New York solution.55 
Sometimes moratoriums make sense, given what we know about the 
likely benefits and risks of an activity. For example, I would probably 
agree that it makes sense to put a moratorium on human cloning 
until we know more about the implications.  
But with respect to fracking, a complete moratorium does not 
seem very sensible. For one thing, hydraulic fracturing has been used 
with conventional vertical wells for sixty years, without any notable 
adverse effects. For another, the scientific explanation for why upward 
migration of fracking fluids will not occur seems plausible and has 
been endorsed in principle by expert panels at the EPA and Energy 
Department.56 To be sure, adding horizontal drilling to fracturing 
increases the risk of subsurface contamination. But it does not change 
the risk very much with respect to surface contamination, except 
insofar as the total amount of fracking activity goes up. In any event, 
it is too late to impose a moratorium on fracking where it is already 
underway, which is lots of places. 
Under the circumstances, the only feasible way to regulate the 
novel water contamination risks presented by fracking is ex post. 
Practically speaking, that means some kind of liability rule for water 
contamination that can be causally linked to fracking activity after it 
occurs. David Schizer and I have an elaborate discussion of what an 
optimal liability regime would look like.57 It would feature rules 
designed to encourage the development of and compliance with best 
practices regulations, mandatory baseline testing of water quality to 
help resolve causation questions, attorney fee shifting for successful 
claimants, and the posting of bonds or evidence of insurance to 
contend with insolvency risks. Ideally, it would be established by 
legislation, most likely at the state rather than the federal level. And 
such ideal legislation, we suggest, would provide for an expeditious 
and inexpensive administrative system for processing claims. 
 
special measures to eliminate those risks, even when existing information 
does not enable regulators to make a reliable judgment about the 
probability that the worst-case scenarios will occur.”). 
55. New York State has imposed an effective moratorium on all fracking 
activity in the state. While rules permitting fracking have been drafted 
by the state Department of Environmental Conservation, vocal 
opposition from environmental groups has led to a sort of regulatory 
paralysis. See Danny Hakim, Shift by Cuomo on Gas Drilling Prompts 
Both Anger and Praise, N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 2012, at A1. 
56. See Shale Gas Prod. Subcomm., supra note 46. 
57. Merrill & Schizer, supra note 50. 
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Unfortunately, the ideal is almost certainly unattainable. The sad 
truth about environmental harms, recognized some years ago by Jim 
Krier in a little essay entitled The End of the World News, is that 
legislatures will not act until there is incontrovertible evidence of a link 
between some activity and a real, tangible harm.58 Abstract demonstra-
tion of a risk will not do. I am reasonably confident this is true of 
fracking. Until there is an irrefutable demonstration that subsurface 
fracking activity has led to a water contamination disaster, we are not 
going to see legislation prescribing a liability regime, ideal or not. 
Happily enough, all is not lost, because we have a nonideal 
liability regime that can be dusted off and applied to any water 
contamination episodes that may occur: the common law of torts. The 
common law of torts does not have all the features that Schizer and I 
recommend, such as fee shifting, the posting of bonds, and 
administrative adjudication. But it is not beyond the realm of 
imagination to think that the common law, when applied to alleged 
water contamination due to fracking, could be applied in such a way as 
to approach the kind of liability system we would consider desirable. 
With respect to the standard of care for example, the common 
law has a number of doctrines that can be deployed to encourage the 
development and compliance with best practices regulations. Violation 
of a best practices rule should be negligence per se. Compliance with a 
rule should give rise to a regulatory compliance defense. And for 
harms that remain untouched by any best practices regulation, res 
ispa loquitur would be appropriate. Practically speaking, this last 
doctrinal move would be tantamount to a kind of strict liability. This, 
we argue, is appropriate, in part to create incentives for producers to 
adjust activity levels and to keep searching for innovative ways to 
minimize harms.  
A somewhat similar story can be told about proof of causation. 
Ordinarily, the plaintiff has the burden of proving causation. This 
could prove to be an almost insuperable barrier in a water 
contamination case, without evidence about the quality of the water 
before fracking activity took place.59 Thus, an ideal liability scheme 
 
58. James E. Krier, The End of the World News, 27 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 
851, 852 (1994). 
59. The complications of proving groundwater contamination are present in 
both litigation and scientific studies. Identifying the specific source of 
methane is difficult by itself, and litigants can rarely prove that methane 
contamination is not naturally occurring. At best, parties may show that 
methane contamination derives from a general area, such as the Marcellus 
Shale, which may not be sufficient to prove causation. An example of this 
issue has been seen in the disputes surrounding water contamination in 
Dimock, Pennsylvania. See Mark Drajem & Jim Efstthiou, Cabot’s 
Methodology Links Tainted Water Wells to Gas Fracking, Bloomberg 
(Oct. 2, 2012, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-02/ 
cabot-s-methodology-links-tainted-water-wells-to-gas-fracking.html. 
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would require baseline testing, mandatory disclosure of fracking 
chemicals, and perhaps even the mandatory use of harmless tracer 
chemicals in fracking fluid, all of which would dramatically lower the 
barriers to establishing causation.60  
A common law court obviously could not mandate all these 
things, certainly not before any suit was filed. But a clever court 
might be able to adopt some presumptions about causation, which 
would have the effect of creating salutary incentives for baseline 
testing. Thus, a court could create a presumption of causation if the 
producer did not obtain water samples before fracking begins. This 
would create an incentive to obtain and secure samples as part of the 
lease negotiation process. And if any landowner refused to cooperate 
in the taking of water samples, the court could create a counter-
presumption of no causation, should that landowner later decide to 
sue for water contamination. So with a little creativity, the common 
law court might make some progress on the causation front.  
The common law has the further virtue that any issue that is 
likely to come up in a liability regime will have come up in some form 
in the common law. Thus, questions about defenses based on plaintiff 
misconduct, joint and several liability, the measure of damages, the 
enforcement of judgments, and so forth, will all have some off-the-
shelf answer under the common law. Any legislated liability rule 
would undoubtedly be incomplete, and would have to draw on the 
common law by analogy in any event.  
Finally, it is also worth noting that state legislatures often 
legislate on discrete issues that arise in the course of common law 
adjudication, in an effort to facilitate better results. If I could single 
out one issue that I would have the legislature weigh in on, it would 
be to require baseline sampling of local water supplies before fracking 
begins. Of course, given the Krier rule—that no environmental 
legislation is forthcoming until harmful effects are established—even 
this may be too much to hope for.61 But it would be worth trying to 
secure such legislation, and this might be something that both 
producers and local opponents could agree upon as a step toward 
alleviating uncertainty about the effects of fracking.  
IV. How Will Fracking Impact Climate Change? 
My fourth question is: what should a concerned citizen worried 
about climate change think of fracking?  
 
60. Chris Mooney, The Truth About Fracking, Sci. Am., Nov. 2011, at 80, 
85 (describing the introduction of tracers into fracking fluid mixtures as 
“relatively easy,” but facing industry opposition). 
61. James E. Krier & Edmund Ursin, Pollution and Policy 1–3, 11 (1977). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 4·2013 
Four Questions About Fracking 
990 
Global warming is a global phenomenon. This means that what 
happens in one part of the world may not do much to stop global 
warming, if it is offset by an equal and opposite change in another part 
of the world. Let me offer an example: Europeans, who care quite a bit 
about climate change, have aggressively pushed alternative energy 
sources like solar and wind power. To pay for this, they have required 
ratepayers to subsidize solar and wind producers through higher rates 
on electricity.62 Higher rates on electricity have accelerated the 
movement of industry from Europe to Asia, where operating costs are 
lower. But in Asia, electricity is predominantly produced by power 
plants that burn coal. So subsidizing alternative energy sources in 
Europe may lead to higher rather than lower greenhouse gas emissions 
on a global basis, as industrial activity shifts from Europe to Asia. 
How does this relate to the fracking revolution in the United 
States? Let’s start with the evidence about the trend in greenhouse 
gas emissions in the last seven years on three continents: Asia, 
Europe, and North America. In Asia, greenhouse gas emissions are up 
quite a bit, as China and other Asian countries rapidly industrialize 
and have built thousands of coal-burning power plants to generate the 
electricity needed to power this industrialization process.63 In Europe, 
greenhouse gas emissions are at best stable or a bit worse.64 Why is 
that? Gas is expensive in Europe, and is subject to uncertainty 
because much of it comes from Russia.65 Nuclear is on the outs after 
 
62. Steven Ferrey et al., Fire and Ice: Renewable Energy and Carbon 
Control Mechanisms Confront Constitutional Barriers, 20 Duke Envtl. 
L. & Pol’y F. 125, 169–71, (2010) (describing the operation of the 
feed-in tariff system used by EU member states to subsidize renewable 
energy). 
63. See Jonathan Kaiman, China’s Emissions Expected to Rise Until 2030, 
Despite Ambitious Green Policies, Guardian (London), Nov. 26, 2012, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/nov/26/china-emissions-
rise-green-policies. 
64. See Fiona Harvey, EU Greenhouse Gas Emissions Rise Despite Climate 
Change Policies, Guardian (London) May 30, 2012, http://www. 
guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/may/30/european-union-greenhouse-
emissions-rise. Greenhouse gas emissions in the European Union are 
based on Kyoto Convention targets relative to base years set by member 
states, with most EU states using 1990 as their base year. Because 
general advances in fuel efficiency have driven down emissions since 
1990, EU member states are considered on-target for reducing emissions, 
even as their year-to-year emissions rise and fall. See EU Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions and Targets, EU Comm’n, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/ 
policies/g-gas/index_en.htm (last visited May 15, 2013). In contrast, the 
U.S. Energy Information Administration measures American emissions 
relative to 2005 levels, so reductions may be more statistically significant. 
65. Natural gas prices in the United States have dropped as low as $3 per 
million British thermal units, but generally settle close to $4. In Europe, 
per unit prices have ranged from $8–$12 in recent years. Global Natural 
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Chernobyl and Fukishima. Renewables are expensive and as yet are a 
relatively small part of the picture. So for a variety of reasons, Europe 
is burning more coal to generate electricity.  
The good news is the United States, where greenhouse gas 
emissions have fallen significantly in the last seven years.66 This is a 
country with no comprehensive climate change policy, and yet it has 
seen better CO2 reductions than many other Western nations. What 
gives? Some of the progress in the United States is due to the 
economic slump and improvements in fuel efficiency of cars. The most 
important contributor, however, is the big shift in power generation 
from coal to natural gas, spurred by the cheap gas generated by the 
fracking revolution.67 Power plants that run on natural gas emit about 
50 percent of the greenhouse gases emitted by plants generated by 
coal. So the displacement of coal plants by cheap natural gas fired 
plants in the United States has given us the winning report card in 
terms of recent progress in controlling greenhouse gas emissions.68  
What if anything can we conclude from this? Not a great deal, 
unfortunately. If the United States gets a B+ for reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions because of a shift from coal to gas, this will matter not 
in the larger picture if the United States continues to outsource 
industrial production to China, which generates power using coal. In 
order for natural gas to make a truly significant contribution to 
greenhouse gas emissions on a global basis, it would be necessary to 
 
Gas Prices Vary Considerably, U.S. Energy Info. Admin. (Sep. 30, 
2011), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=3310. 
66. See Benoit Faucon & Keith Johnson, U.S. Redraws World Oil Map, 
Wall St. J., Nov. 13, 2012, at A1 (quoting estimate of International 
Energy Agency). Greenhouse gas emissions in the United States have 
declined approximately 7 percent from 2005 levels. This decline is 
remarkable by itself, yet future trends are even more surprising: by 
current Energy Information Agency estimates, greenhouse gas emissions 
are expected to remain below 2005 levels through 2035. Joel Kirkland, 
U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emission Decline Despite Political Gridlock, Sci. 
Am. (Jan 25, 2012), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=us-
greenhouse-gas-emissions-decline-despite-political-gridlock.  
67. See U.S. Energy-Related CO2 Emissions in Early 2012 Lowest Since 
1992, U.S. Energy Info. Admin. (Aug. 1, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/ 
todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=7350. 
68. This judgment is complicated by the fact that more gas production 
means more methane leaking into the atmosphere, and methane is itself 
a potent (but relatively more short-lived) greenhouse gas. Thus, it has 
been argued that on a “life cycle” basis it is not clear that the natural 
gas revolution will yield a reduction in greenhouse gases overall. 
Fortunately, producers have an economic incentive to minimize gas 
leaks, because it costs them money. This incentive, plus new EPA 
regulations designed to reduce fugitive gas emissions, will hopefully keep 
natural gas in the winning column in terms of climate effects. For a 
review of the empirical literature, see Merrill and Schizer, supra note 50. 
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replace the use of coal with natural gas in Europe, Asia, and the rest 
of the developing world, as well as in the United States. This could 
happen. One small step in the right direction would be for the United 
States to develop a robust export industry in liquefied natural gas.69 
This would help make a partial transition to gas possible in countries 
like Japan. Of course, the more we export gas, the higher the price of 
gas in the United States, which could slow down the transition to gas 
here. Longer term, other countries in Europe and Asia are likely to 
adopt fracking technology themselves, and expand their own gas 
reserves. A small step in this direction would be for the United States 
to encourage the export of fracking technology to countries on other 
continents. Twenty years from now, we could be seeing China 
switching from coal to gas based on the development of new gas 
reserves using fracking technology on shale deposits in China.  
Another variable in all this is oil. If fracking technology in the 
United States and elsewhere expands the production of oil, this will 
tend to hold price increases in oil in check. Lower prices of oil, 
relatively speaking, will encourage more cars and more driving, which 
will add to the total volume of greenhouse gas emissions worldwide. 
Electric cars may provide a partial answer to this. But again, if the 
electric cars sold in China are recharged with electricity coming from 
new coal burning plants, little will be gained. So it all comes back to 
the coal plants in China. 
A third variable to add to the mix is the impact of the fracking 
revolution on renewables. Cheap gas, as I said at the outset of these 
remarks, is poison for renewables. If we assume that technology 
stands still from now until the end of the twenty-first century, 
renewables will never be able to compete with cheap gas without 
massive government subsidies. And the lesson of history, at least in 
the United States, is that subsidies for alternative fuels are not 
politically sustainable.70 In a static technological world, the best bet 
for heading off climate change risk would probably be to press ahead 
on all fronts to promote the use of fracking in generating cheap gas.  
But of course, technology does not stand still. Over time, there is 
reason to believe we will achieve a technological breakthrough in 
renewables, analogous to the breakthrough achieved with fracking. 
Which brings me back to my first question—how to stimulate 
innovation in the production of energy. To promote innovation, the 
government should strive to create the conditions in which 
 
69. Exporting liquefied natural gas is difficult technically, and further 
complicated politically. LNG export plants require approval from the 
Department of Energy, which has been withheld in recent years due to 
political pressures. Currently, only one out of over twenty potential 
LNG export terminals has received federal approval. See Better Out 
Than In, Economist, Mar. 2, 2013, at 13.  
70. Graetz, supra note 27 at 153–54. 
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entrepreneurial ventures thrive. Another constructive form of 
government intervention here would be a carbon tax, which would 
seek to equalize the social costs of carbon fuels and renewables, and 
thereby put renewables on a level playing field with carbon fuels. 
When are countries most likely to adopt a carbon tax? When the 
price of carbon fuels is going down, not up.71 And what is it that is 
most likely to bring the price of carbon fuels down in the foreseeable 
future? Fracking.  
So I would conclude that a conscientious citizen concerned about 
global warming should support the fracking revolution. Cheap gas will 
upend nuclear and renewables at least temporarily, but more 
importantly it will displace coal. If this can be done on a global basis, 
big progress will have been made against global warming. Cheap gas 
and potentially cheaper oil also make it more likely that legislatures 
will agree to adopt a carbon tax, which could help stimulate 
innovation in renewables over the long term. Cheap gas is thus 
probably the best strategy on the horizon for reducing greenhouse 
gases, until we see a technological breakthrough in renewables. And 
the only way to get cheap gas is to support fracking. 
 
71. See Thomas W. Merrill & David M. Schizer, Energy Policy for an 
Economic Downturn: A Proposed Petroleum Fuel Price Stabilization 
Plan, 27 Yale J. Reg. 1 (2010). This is partly a function of loss 
aversion or the endowment effect: imposing a tax when prices are stable 
or rising is experienced as a loss, whereas imposing a tax when prices are 
falling is experienced as forgoing a potential gain. Id. at 29. 
  
 
   
